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SPEECH

IN THE WAKE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:
RETHINKING RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENTt
ANNE SIMPSON*

Rethinking "Responsible Investment" in the wake of the
financial crisis is a daunting theme, and one best accomplished
with some humility. Responsible Investment is a beguilingly simple but elusive notion. As we survey the damage wrought by the
crisis and attempt to build some safety and soundness into the
financial system, how could the notion of Responsible Investment not be viewed as a useful approach in the capital markets?
Responsible Investment is, by definition, a valuable notion.
Responsibility is quintessential for fiduciaries-those investing
on behalf of others. The question then is perhaps not whether
Responsible Investment might be a good idea, but what is holding it back? What would cause Responsible Investment to lose its
rather platitudinous moniker-responsible-and simply become
"investment"? If markets are efficient, because information is
sufficient and investors are rational,' then Responsible Investment would be nothing worthy of comment. Irresponsible
investment would represent the occasional excess, indiscretion,
or folly.
The current situation, however, appears more complex and
the problems more intractable. We have a tragedy of the comt Based on an Address given at the Great Committee Room, House of
Commons, Annual Fair Pensions Lecture (Nov. 23, 2010), available at http://
www.fairpensions.org.uk/sites/default/files/uploadedjfiles/Annesimpsonpdf.
pdf. Special thanks to Adrian Cadbury who set this all out very clearly in his
pioneering code of corporate practice.
* Senior Portfolio Manager, Investments and Head of Corporate Governance, California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS); Senior
Faculty Fellow, Yale School of Management.
1. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. Cox, CORPORATIONS & OTHER
BUSINEsS ORGANIZATIONS 56-61 (10th ed. 2011) (discussing generally the concept of market efficiency, hypothesis and qualifications).
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mons.2 No single actor has the power, or perhaps even the
motive, to solve systemic problems in the capital markets, but
each individual player suffers from those systemic failures. The
proposition is that the concept of Responsible Investment can
provide some guidance on how to navigate this complex terrain.
Individual actors following the precepts of Responsible Investment may bring order to some of the chaos and undesirable outcomes of modern capital market volatility, short-term focus, and
inability to price vitally important externalities, such as environmental damage.
A wide variety of definitions exist as to what Responsible
Investment might be-all variations on a theme, including sustainable or ethical investing, active ownership, or related to the
environmental, social and governance themes ("ESG"). All of
these approaches attempt to do something beguilingly simple:
ensure an optimal outcome for those benefitting from and
affected by the investment process. The alphabet soup of shorthand in this arena (ESG, Responsible Investment ["RI"], Socially
Responsible Investment ["SRI"] and more) reflects the proposition that current arrangements do not lead to optimal outcomes.
Capital markets may be more efficient, in the short-term or for
certain players, but more is needed to ensure that investment
meets its best purpose; that is, capital must be allocated to where
there is productive potential and monitoring that allocation to
ensure that it is effectively deployed.
The invention of the corporate form and the systems of
finance to support its growth have evolved, like most else in
human history, as ways to meet human needs and wants. The
system has been prone to crisis and overhauls at regular intervals
from the start. The reaction to such collapse and disaster has, at
times, been extreme. The Bubble Act of 1720, for example,
banned incorporation for over a century in reaction to the South
Sea Crisis.' The Joint Stock Company was pieced together over
several decades after ill-tempered debates and disagreements in
the British Parliament occurred over what was necessary for capi2. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1243-48 (1968) (describing the theory of the Tragedy of the Commons).
3.

See generally Paul W. MacAvoy & Ira M. Millstein, The Current Cnisis, in

The Recurrent Crisis in Corporate Governance 7 (Paul W. MacAvoy & Ira M.
Millstein eds., 2003); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WootRmDna., THE CoM
PANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2003) (providing an overview of the rise of business from 3000 BC to the multinational state
corporations in 2002).
4. 6 Geo., c. 18 (1720).
5. See MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 3, at 31-33.
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tal accumulation and what safeguards were sufficient to protect
the public from the risks posed by the corporation and the
potential for wild excess.'
When I first studied economics in the late 1970s it was considered the study of large and complex-but essentially mechanistic-processes. Students were taught econometrics as though
there were simple levers and pulleys to explain money supply and
inflation. The task of the government was to ensure those cogs
and pulleys were at the proper settings. The task of corporate
management was to behave rationally in response to those mechanisms, which would, in turn, determine costs and profit. The
investor simply needed to understand basic concepts that could
probably be worked out with the stub of a pencil on the back of
an envelope: the discounted rate of return relative to the alternative opportunities and the investor's needs (cash versus capital
over the period and knowledge of the investor's particular appetite for risk). This was all very pleasing to a young student
because world problems, against a backdrop of post-War growth,
could be solved with simple arithmetic.
My economics tutor at St Hilda's College, Oxford was a gentle, but formidable woman who, at six feet tall, towered over her
students, and strode around the college in tweeds and men's
shoes. She had advised the National Government in the United
Kingdom during the War and the Labour government in the
aftermath. We were enthralled by our Don, who had not only
grappled academically with the subject of economics, but had
also been in public service during a time of great crisis. She
understood all too well the limits of her subject. How could
those equations describing the workings of the economyemployment, inflation, taxes, the very well-being of nation-ever
be relied upon? Many years after her service to the government,
classical economics was straining to explain events: industrial
conflict, political strife, social protest against foreign wars, and
calls for reordering labour markets in favour of equality. Little of
this was captured in those previous equations. My tutor had a
helpful explanation for those equations that would not balance:
the factor "X" should be inserted. But what did X represent?
"Think of X as accounting for human nature," she said. In other
words, our economic calculations would explain events if we
could just control for human nature.
Controlling for human nature in economics has since
become a respectable subject for inquiry. Concern with human
6. See generally id., at 32, 39-43 (discussing generally the effects of the
Bubble Act on the Joint Stock Company).

76

NOTE DAME ]OURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 26

happiness, social welfare, and even "sustainability" has been a
fundamental concern since commerce and its companion,
financing for that commerce, began-this was also true with
codes of conduct and decent business behaviour. These principles were not the sole province of religion. Take for example
one of the earliest surviving examples, the Hammurabi scripts
from Mesopotamia.' This Code set the price and quality of
goods, and specified punishments for spoiling property.'
The current round of debate on standards in commerce,
finance, trade, and the regulation thereof has long roots to the
origins of the corporation and trade. It is easy to be seduced
with the suggestion of progress-but we are still wrestling with
how to meet human needs and wants, and to harness the animal
spirit of the market to achieve that cause.
The scale of the financial crisis has illustrated that investors
are no longer simply challenged on long-standing issues of concern, such as the despoiling of the environment, degrading of
resources, the fair treatment of labour, customers, or even corruption of government." Investors are also being challenged on
their ability to discharge responsibility for routine matters including: managing risk, overseeing conflicts of interest, and being
competent or even efficient in allocating assets to match
liabilities.
To compound the problem, the basic architecture of the
financial system is creaking. Markets are global, complex, and,
too often, opaque. The governance systems for regulating the
markets are based on nineteenth century designs. The truth is
that those concerned with Responsible Investment will not make
progress unless these wider issues related to the soundness of the
capital markets are addressed.
The task for the Responsible Investment movement, therefore, is to engage with the mainstream. Some key areas where
collaboration of thinking between the Responsible Investment
followers and the mainstream is required include: the regulatory
framework, accounting and auditing procedures, pension deficits, retirement security across the population, asset allocation
7. See generally The Code of Hammurabi,THE AVAiLON PROJECT (2008), http:/
/avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/hamframe.asp.
8. See, e.g., id. at para. 108 (describing an especially harsh punishment for
watering beer-merchants were to be drowned in their own swill).
9. See generally Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of InternationalInvestment Agreements, 13 J. Int'l Econ. L. 1037, 1037 (2010)

(discussing the position of international investors and balancing the protection
of society and the environment).
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against a backdrop of lower growth and higher volatility, fees,
incentives, and governance across the chain of intermediaries.
Take, for example, the shifting landscape of pension funds,
an area where the situation continues to be uncertain and can be
treacherous. Underfunding presents a major challenge. Pension deficits have ballooned. The pressure to get investment
right is intense because it is the main source of funding for these
benefits plans. This fragility was met-and magnified-by the
assault of the financial crisis. The difficult question of investment strategy rests against this backdrop of pension deficits, in a
market environment where lower growth and higher volatility is
the norm. If one refuses to grapple with the consequences of
inaction, the calls for pension funds to address the critical issues
in Responsible Investment will be overcome by more pressing
concerns because, in the hierarchy of needs, survival comes first.
And the effects on these primary savings vehicles will set the
scene for what can be expected of pension funds as shareholders.
Another shift in the pension landscape also affects the world
of Responsible Investment-the shift in pension vehicles from
single employer defined benefit schemes to private individual
holdings. This has not only increased risk for individuals and
driven up the costs of administration, o thereby eating heavily
into returns, but has also fragmented and intermediated the
ownership base of market capitalism.
This fragmentation has been exacerbated by intermediation
in the investment chain. The distance between ultimate owners
and companies appears insurmountable when ownership and
control are not only separated but also made tenuous through
complex instruments and holding vehicles that lack clear
disclosure.
Some argue that the notion of ownership is simply misplaced. I disagree. We may consider the legal and technical
niceties to exclude the owners of shares from being conflated as
ownership of companies, but whilst equity providers have the
right to hire and fire the board, can wind up the enterprise, vote
on its fate, and are entitled to the residual returns, we have a
close approximation. There is also the delicate question of the
alternative. If not shareowners, then who? Government does not
shine in the role. Employees have a legitimate place in many
governance systems, but they are rare in the U.S. and U.K. mar10. See David Pitt-Watson, Tomorrow's Investor: Building the Consensus for a
People's Pension in Britain, RSA PROJECTS 19 (Dec. 2010), http://www.thersa.org/

data/assets/pdfjfile/0009/366948/RSA-TI-report-ensions.pdf.
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kets. Management? Banks? We need to work with the imperfect
realities in which ownership is no longer a proxy for control.
Responsible Investment rests on the simple premise that
owners of capital have an alignment of interest with wider society. In turn, they have been granted rights and powers in many
markets that enable them to hold companies to account. This
should not be overstated. Diversified portfolios often result in
small holdings, and fragmented power. Exercising influence
requires collaboration, which is time-consuming and difficult,
even if ultimately fruitful.
Many markets do not allow investors to exercise basic rights.
Rather than engage in pure democratic processes, director elections are often met with tenacity. In the U.S., companies have
been under sustained pressure to allow a "no" vote on the election of directors, but those directors continue to hold their posts
on their respective corporate boards."
Also, in many markets, the pattern of ownership militates
against the simple oversight model envisaged by Responsible
Investment. Most European and Asian markets have concentrated ownership: families, the state, and corporate cross holdings.' 2 This means that controlling shareholders call the shots.
Minority shareholders have become more active in markets as
diverse as Brazil, Korea, Italy, and even Russia but they still have
their work cut out for them.
Note that shareholders will have different goals and time
frames. Conflicts of interest prevent some from acting; shortterm investment goals make it rational to ignore anything
beyond trading information for others. The "rethink" needs to
start with realism. We should conduct triage on Responsible
Investment: there are owners, traders, and raiders. Understanding which group the investor falls into, or moves between, will
11.

See Facts at a Glance: Corporate Governance, CALIFORNIA PuBiC EmPcovSYSTEM 3-4 (Oct. 2011), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/
about/facts/corpgov.pdf (describing shareowner proxy access as a "top
CalPERS governance priority" because without such access "the director election process simply becomes a ratification of corporate management's slate of
nominees"). "CalPERS believes proxy access is a fundamental shareowner right
that allows investors reasonable access to place nominees on corporate proxy
ballots with all nominees being subsequently subject to a vote of the majority of
shareowners." Id. See also Enhanced Investor Protection After the Financial Crisis:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong.
7-8 (2011) (statement of Anne Simpson in Dodd-Frank provisions relating to
shareowners' right to vote in director elections).
12. See, e.g., Stjn Claessens & Joseph P. H. Fan, Corporate Governance in
Asia: A Survey, 3 INT'L R. OF FIN. 71, 74 (2002).
FEs' RFTIREMENT
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explain their appetite for Responsible Investment. It will also
position them for a different role in the capital markets.
This is not a counsel of despair-quite the reverse. By being
honest and realistic about what drives the investment agenda, we
can make sure we become more effective in proposals for
reform, be that through practice or regulation.
CalPERS is engaged in its own overhaul of Responsible
Investment, through a project to integrate environmental, social
and governance issues into our investment strategy across our
This is no small undertaking. CalPERS
asset classes."
approaches this work through a familiar framework. One dimension is Responsible Investment work designed to protect our
beta" returns. This is the bulk of our fund's risk and return,
which reflects our exposure to global economic growth, and
gives us an interest in systemic risk and market integrity. We
have an active programme of engagement with legislators, regulators and leaders in the development of market best practice.
We call this workstream our focus on Financial Market Reform.
This is complemented by the alpha" contribution to our
governance agenda. This is where we pursue company-specific
engagements in order to tackle particular risks or
underperformance. An example is the Focus List Program, in
which CalPERS identifies companies with significant governance
weakness and financial underperformance. Over a significant
period of time, ten years, there is evidence that this active ownership strategy has added value for the fund."
We are now planning a "total fund" process to ensure that
our strategy is effective across all of our asset classes. The proposition is that if ESG strategies can contribute to risk management and enhancement of returns, we should consider this in
13. See Anne Simpson, Responsible Investment's Next Decade: Developing
CalPERS Total Fund Process for ESG Integration, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'

3 (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/
investments/video-center/view-video/mercer-report-next-decade.pdf.
14. "Beta" reflects the extent to which an investment reflects the risk of
larger market fluctuations. An investment with a positive beta generally follows
market gains and losses, while investments with a negative beta tend to move in
opposition to the market. Beta is also sometimes referred to as market risk and
non-diversifiable risk, given its reference to the market.
15. See Facts at a Glance, supra note 11, at 4-5 (discussing CalPERS Financial Market Reform).
16. "Alpha" reflects the rate of return on an investment once market risk
has been accounted for, showing the excess return on an investment over and
against the risk assumed.
17. See Facts at a Glance, supra note 11, at 3 (discussing the Wilshire Consulting study to the CalPERS Board).
RETIREMENT SYSTEM
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order to improve our decision making whenever, and however,
we allocate capital. The trick is to ensure that our strategies in
certain asset classes (public vs. private) or capital forms (debt vs.
equity) have been well considered and are complementary across
the portfolio.
Throughout this process, collaboration with other asset owners is vital. CalPERS formed a Peer Exchange that includes some
of the world's largest asset owners so that we can learn how to
improve our practice, and also coordinate where there exists a
common interest. Although CalPERS may be the largest public
fund in the United States, with the considerable heft of a $220
billion portfolio, we still need to collaborate.
There is also a special character to working for an investment office with fiduciary duties to the 1.6 million beneficiaries
who will rely upon the fund for their retirement. The investment
office is located at the local Sacramento branch of the CalPERS
benefits office. This is a wholly good thing. There is no sense in
being removed from those you are working for. It is also a
reminder of the need to balance investment objectives. CalPERS
is not just a long-term investor, it verges on permanence. But
along the way, the fund has to pay out billions in cash each year
by way of benefits. That gives us a keen interest in the short
term, as well as a fiduciary duty to consider the long-term. By
virtue of size, we are a universal owner, and have an interest in
the financial system, as market-wide returns are the fund's main
source of financing for benefit payments. This sets the stage for
our review of our own strategy for Responsible Investment. Put
simply, our objective is to make Responsible Investment our
investment strategy. We are at the beginning of this process and
there is much to do. The wake of the financial crisis brings a new
imperative to Responsible Investment, but one which drives us
toward integration with wider financial and market reform. The
watchword is sustainability: over time and across asset classes.
Sustainability inherently captures the financial duties of a fiduciary. In its simplest form, sustainability means the ability to continue. Responsible investors need to integrate their financial
with their ESG objectives. Both are needed for sustainability.

